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Abstract 
This is a prepublication version of an analysis of the world economy which 
appeared in ‘The Inequality of Nations’ in Freeman, A, and Boris Kagarlitsky 
(eds) (2004) The Politics of Empire: Globalisation in crisis. London: Pluto Press. 
ISBN: 0 74532 183 6. 
It develops and presents rigorously much of the analysis of ‘The New world 
order and the failure of globalisation’ presented to the annual conference of the 
British International Studies Association in 2002. To this it adds a substantial 
analysis of inequality within the main continental blocs in the economy today. 
It uses data published by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook team to assess 
the progress of inequality and grown since ‘globalisation’, understood as the 
period of intense financial deregulation and the creation of a world market in 
capital. 
It establishes that over the period of globalisation world inequality, measured 
as the ratio of income per capita in the global south as a whole and the global 
north as a whole, has more than doubled, whilst growth has been largely static.  
Inequality between the nations making up the ‘global south’ has however 
decreased rather than increased; thus the world economy retains, in a remarkably 
stable manner, the same characteristics it has possessed since 1914. It contains a 
bloc of rich nations containing about one fifth the population of the world, and the 
remainder, containing four-fifth the population, with inequality between the two 
blocs rising secularly in the long run. 
The article argues that competition between advanced nations now takes place 
on a continental scale, a process driving European responses to the crisis of US 
hegemony, and that responses from within the global south can be expected to 
acquire also a continental dimension. 
Two supplementary documents contain charts and slides used to present the 
material to a seminar organised by the Norway Social Forum in Oslo, June 2003 
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The inequality of nations 
Alan Freeman 
1.1 ABSOLUTE DIVERGENCE 
The rich and the rest: the two great blocs of the world economy 
Chart 1 shows how the income of the world was shared between the countries 
that the IMF classifies as ‘Advanced’ and all the rest.1 Chart 2 shows the 
proportions of world population living in these two parts of the world. 
Chart 1: Share of world income      Advanced      The rest2 
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Chart 2: Share of world population      Advanced      The rest 
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Between 1980 and 2000 the rest of the world’s share shrank from just under 30 
per cent of the whole world’s income to just under 20 per cent. At the same time, 
the proportion of people living there rose from 80 per cent to 84 per cent. 
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It follows that when the present stage of globalisation began, dating this as 
1980, the income of the advanced countries was 11 times larger, in proportion to 
their population, than the rest of the world. By 2000 this ratio had risen to 23. 
Globalisation has thus doubled the inequality between the advanced countries 
and the rest of the world in twenty years. This inequality, measured as the ratio 
between average income in the two parts of the world, grew at an annual rate of 
2.4 per cent in the ten years before globalisation, and an annual rate of 3.9 per 
cent in the 22 years thereafter. 
Globalisation, in a nutshell, equals divergence. 
Table 1 GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars 
  Annual Growth 
rate, per cent  
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 1970-
1980 
1980-
2002 
Advanced countries $10,473 $18,088 $23,989 $26,201 $25,672 5.6 1.8
Rest of the World $1,248 $1,690 $1,356 $1,160 $1,100 3.1 -2.1
Ratio of GDP per capita, 
Advanced/Rest of the world 8.4 10.7 17.7 22.6 23.3 2.4 3.9
Population of the Advanced 
Countries(millions)3 718 778 827 833 845 0.4 0.8
Population of the Rest of the 
World(millions)  2,810  3,466  4,213  4,288  4,431 1.2 2.1
We can express the average incomes in constant 1995 dollars. 4 This is shown in 
table 1. While output per person in the advanced countries rose from $18,100 to 
$26,200, in the rest of the world it fell from $1,700 to $1,100.  
Globalisation has thus re-asserted, and sharpened to its greatest extent ever, a 
phenomenon which has dominated world economics and politics for a hundred 
and fifty years – the division of the world’s nations into two fundamentally 
unequal blocs. 
The rich fall out: behind the US miracle 
Over the same period there has been a complete reversal in the relation between 
the USA and the other advanced parts of the world. Table 3 compares growth 
rates over each of the three decades up to 2000, and chart 2 shows the results in 
detail. 
It is well known that the USA led world growth during the nineties.5 It is less 
well known that this was not because it performed any better than at any time in 
the last half century, but because everyone else performed considerably worse. A 
prolonged phase of high growth rates among the USA’s principal competitors, 
lasting from the early fifties, ended. Their growth rates fell to the level that the 
USA has suffered since the late 1960s.6 
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Chart 2: real GDP per capita, constant US dollars 
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This reverses the relation between the US and those wealthy countries which 
previously functioned as its unquestioning partners. Until 1980 North America 
was growing slower, in terms of real dollars, than all other parts of the world.7 
Thus, the economic interests of the advanced countries lay in accepting US 
leadership, not only in the direction not only of the world economy but in much 
world politics as well. German and Japanese strategy was, in essence, to fall in 
behind the USA politically as a means of outdoing it economically.  
Table 3: growth rates in the advanced and advancing countries 
Total growth of GDP per capita 
(per cent over the decade) 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 
North America 24.6 24.8 20.9 
Euro Area 122.0 25.4 -8.4 
South-East Asia 128.9 68.1 19.9 
Rest of the world 35.4 -19.8 -14.5 
Globalisation has undone the material basis for this coalition. The last vestiges of 
the postwar expansion were crushed out of the USA’s rivals in two waves, one in 
each decade of globalisation.  
The second of these two waves was far more decisive. After an initial fall 
during 1980-85, both Europe and South-east Asia regained ground and by 1990 
Europe had caught up its losses whilst South East Asia had resumed its high 
growth trend, pulling away still further from North America. Thus the opening 
years of globalisation did much to drive the advanced countries away from the 
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rest, but did little to drive the advanced countries apart. The 1990s marked a 
historical rupture. From around 1995 all parts of the world slowed down relative 
to North America – including the other parts of the ‘Advanced’ world. By 2002 
the USA had made good all its previous losses relative to South East Asia, and, in 
terms of cumulative GDP per capita growth, had clawed back the historical lead 
of the European Union. 
1.2 ABSOLUTE STAGNATION 
In the 1990s, accelerated divergence was joined by a further process: stagnation. 
This was brought about by the US’s own failure to raise its growth rate and by 
sharp declines in the growth rates of the other major advanced countries. 
Divergence, combined with stagnation, has produced the present political crisis of 
world governance. 
Stagnation is particularly striking because it has gone almost unnoticed. In a 
nutshell, as chart 1 shows, world GDP per capita has started going down. 
Chart 1: world per capita GDP and world GDP, constant 1995 dollars 
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In 1988, the GDP of the world in constant 1995 dollars was $4,885. By 2002, 
it was $4,778. That is, over the intervening fourteen years, in real dollar terms, it 
fell absolutely. As table 2 shows, prior to the present stage of globalisation world 
GDP per capita was rising at between three and four percent a year. In the first 
decade of globalisation this fell to less than one per cent and throughout the 
nineties it has been negative. Globalisation has not increased the rate of world 
growth: it has diminished it absolutely. 
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Table 2 Annual world growth rates, constant 1995 dollars 
 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 
World per capita GDP 4.2% 0.8% -0.2% 
World total GDP 6.1% 2.5% 1.2% 
1.3 DIVERGENCE, STAGNATION AND THE END OF 
GLOBALISATION 
Conventional economic wisdom holds that globalisation was an economic 
success but a political failure. In fact it has been a political triumph and an 
economic catastrophe. 
Its success lay in creating a governing bloc which regulated the way in which 
almost all nations participated in the world market, so that despite exceptions – 
most notably China – a more or less uniform economic order, with a single 
integrated economic policy, was implemented worldwide. This bloc was 
dominated by the rich nations and hegemonised by the USA. Its social base 
included the bulk of the population of the wealthy countries, a majority in their 
more successful clients, and a minority but governing class in the poorest 
countries. 
European and Japanese support was secure, as was that of the NIACs, as long 
as the advanced or advancing countries grew at the expense of the rest. 
Elsewhere, pro-globalisation governments formed wherever substantial elites 
could reap private benefits, enjoying living standards rising above the general 
level in their countries – particularly where they were integrated into circuits of 
world financial capital. In those many countries where the beneficiaries of 
globalisation were thin on the ground, the bloc governed quite simply through 
fear: the twin threats posed by debt and capital flight. 
Because of this basic consensus, much of the economic regulation of the world 
could safely be delegated to transnational bodies such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation. Enforcement 
was not a substantive problem because, in each individual state, a politically 
functional government could be formed which was committed to implementing 
the global world economic consensus. 
But this political pyramid rested on an unsustainable economic base. Political 
cohesion is incompatible with economic divergence. Generally speaking, the 
deeper the economic differences between people, the deeper their political 
antagonisms. Thus the only form of globalisation that can ultimately succeed 
politically is one based on the reduction of economic difference, not on its 
increase. 
Such political antagonisms can be suspended or offset in a situation where 
world output is generally increasing, because in that case divergence is only 
relative. If most of those that are falling behind nevertheless enjoy a rising 
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standard of living, and if growth in the richer parts of the world generates a 
politically-accessible surplus sufficient to head off political conflict, then open 
national and political conflict can be contained or avoided. 
This was the case in the golden age of the fifties and sixties when there was a 
general and prolonged Kondratieff upswing. Although nations continued to move 
apart from one another, this meant only that some were growing faster than 
others, so that the number of absolutely poor people was falling. Divergence now, 
however, combines with stagnation. Conflict ceases to be one of many possible 
recourses: for more and more people, it becomes the only recourse. This, in 
effect, removes the entire basis for liberal democracy, since if people have no 
option but to fight each other in order to survive, no amount of wise regulation is 
going to stop them. 
Through stagnation combined with divergence, globalisation itself is 
dissolving the pro-globalisation bloc, literally tearing it apart. Large tracts of the 
world have been rendered ungovernable. At best it is increasingly difficult to form 
stable governments which can survive politically whilst carrying out IMF 
policies, as the case of Argentina dramatically demonstrates. At worst, in cases 
such as Afghanistan the Middle East, and increasingly in Africa, political 
instability dominates an entire region.  
The political institutions which have made globalisation possible have thus 
eroded the economic circumstances which made their own existence possible. 
This has exposed the absolute limits within which they functioned as world 
institutions. The basic weakness of the IMF is that it has no means of 
enforcement. This is particularly important for the market in capital – which is 
what really distinguishes the period of ‘globalisation’ from the general expansion 
of the world market. Without enforcement, a debtor can simply renege, unless 
legally sanctioned force compels her or him to conform. Hence when the 
governments of Russia or Argentina simply refused to honour their 
internationally-contracted debts, there was actually nothing the IMF could do 
except complain.  
A nation state can use internal force, within its boundaries, to distrain any 
individual or corporate body that fails to comply with its laws. No such sanction 
exists on the international level. The IMF does not have an army or a police force. 
Therefore no matter how draconian, its policies, imposed through ‘structural 
adjustment’ plans, have always required the consent of the government 
concerned, in turn coerced by the threat of debt, and it is the national government 
that has been allocated the awkward job of suppressing domestic opposition. As 
countries gradually realise that there is indeed a fate worth than debt, it becomes 
harder and harder to secure this governmental consent; governments that do so 
consent have simply become politically unsustainable. 
This leaves only one recourse if an advanced country wishes to impose 
policies on countries which cannot sustain governments which consent to them – 
conquest. If a country’s governing institutions refuse to implement measures 
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which are likely to lead to it losing office, there is no alternative but to set up 
alternative institutions by external intervention. There is no other means of 
compelling a country to adopt policies, or pay debts, which its government 
refuses to accept. 
The problem with force, and conquest, is that it is basically impossible to 
secure multilateral consent; conquering force is therefore the ultimate prerogative 
of the national state. On this terrain, there has been no erosion of sovereign 
national powers whatsoever. Conquest is therefore organised by national states.  
This fact ultimately renders a multinational capitalist government impossible. 
There is a solid material reason; the conquerors are themselves not bound by the 
laws of contract. They can simply impose economic terms – as is the case, for 
example, with the disposition of Iraqi oil. To the conquerors belong the spoils. 
Conquest and war are, therefore, the ultimate and logical form of economic 
competition. 
This, not terrorism, is what led the US to revert to a unilateralist agenda and 
bypass the international institutions. It substituted direct military and political 
intervention for the old ‘hands-off’ policy of leaving the IMF to get on with the 
job on behalf of Wall Street, because the IMF could no longer do the job. 
John Williamson,8 who coined the term “Washington Consensus” explains this 
process clearly: 
[T]here is no longer any agreement on the main lines of economic policy between the 
current U.S. administration and the international financial institutions. …there is now a 
critical difference in attitudes toward capital account liberalization in the emerging market 
countries, with the IMF having beaten a well-advised retreat since the Asian crisis (see, for 
example, Rogoff, 2002), while the Bush administration is still using bilateral free trade 
agreements to bully countries like Chile and Singapore into emasculating even the most 
enlightened capital controls. And even on trade, the international financial institutions 
have expressed strong criticism of U.S. policy on agriculture and steel. So, in this sense, 
any Washington Consensus has simply ceased to exist—a reflection of the chasm that the 
Bush administration has opened up between the United States and the rest of the world.9 
A second process accompanied this, and sealed the fate of the international 
institutions. At the same time that it lost its capacity to create stable governing 
blocs in the third world, the US has lost its political hegemony over its erstwhile 
partners. Multilateral conquest is bringing no multilateral benefits. A unilateral 
US agenda means not only that the US administration has abandoned the 
multilateral institutions, but that it has also made the conscious decision to 
advance its own interests over those of its erstwhile partners. The Iraq war made 
this finally clear to everyone. France and Germany opposed US policy in Iraq, not 
for humanitarian motives,10 but because their economic needs were too brutally 
counterposed to those of the USA. 
Finally, and not least – since it is probably the reason that this book exists – as 
the multilateral benefits from globalisation erode away, the fragile support of the 
working class within the advanced countries, above all Europe, has fallen away. 
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This is what really lies behind the startling growth of the ‘Northern’ component of 
the anti-globalisation movement and the peace movement alike.  
Globalisation, as it has existed for the past 23 years, is self-destructing. It has 
given birth to a new age: of protectionism, rivalry, and war. 
1.4 THE NEW AGE OF COMPETITIVE REGIONALISM 
What shape might politics take in this emerging brave new world? In the third 
part of this chapter, I will try to answer this question in more detail by looking at 
its economic underpinnings. I will try to examine the possible shape of twenty-
first century politics by looking at the structure of divergence within and between 
the world’s major regions. First, however, some basic methodological questions 
have to be answered, the first of which is the relation between economics and 
politics. Most basic of these is: why is the state necessary at all? 
A straightforward consequence of standard economic theory11 is that the 
‘natural’ tendency of markets is convergence. Divergence, according to almost all 
orthodox theory and quite a lot of heterodoxy, is not produced by markets but 
happens in spite of them – it is either the result of misguided government, malign 
forces such as trades unions, terrorists, and anti-globalists, or is just a residual 
effect of a backward past before markets came to the rescue. In technical 
language, convergence is endogenous to the market and divergence is exogenous.  
This is difficult to square with the evidence, given that the world has been 
diverging more or less since the world market began by almost any measure that 
one cares to adopt, and has done so faster when obstacles to it have been 
weakest.12 Indeed it is now harder than ever, since perhaps for the first time in 
history, the whole world is basically capitalist. In a certain sense, the past period 
of globalisation has finally settled the case against all theories of development 
which seek to explain the world economy as an interaction between capitalism 
and ‘pre-capitalist’ obstacles – not least, that of Rosa Luxemburg. No serious pre-
capitalist obstacles to the market remain. The jury is no longer out: capitalism is 
responsible for the course of capitalist development. 
A number of more or less sophisticated economic theories – the new trade 
theory, endogenous growth theory, and so on – seek to explain divergence 
through the interaction of the market with non-market phenomena. But with the 
exception of Marx’s work, no body of economic theory contains within it the 
natural conclusion that markets create divergence simply because they are 
markets. If divergence is explained at all, it is explained as an exception. More 
usually, it is claimed, with an almost religious blindness to basic facts, that 
divergence does not happen. 
What consequence does this have for the future of the state? It is my view that 
globalisation theory, to a great extent a creation of non-economists, has 
uncritically and unquestioningly absorbed the outlook of the economists, of 
whom it should have been far more critical. From the economists, it has become 
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imbued with the idea that the state is an economical anachronism. But what is the 
theoretical origin of this idea? Basically, from an ideological premise: from the 
view that, left to its own devices, the market homogenises.  
If this were true, it would surely remove one of the basic reasons that sets 
people against each other. One of the most basic functions of the state – to 
regulate and contain conflict – would, if economic orthodoxy were true, be 
economically dissolved. 
But if divergence is the natural tendency of the market, precisely the opposite 
conclusion follows. All social conflicts are sharpened by divergence, the ultimate 
outcome being war. Politics has an indispensable function: to contain – or indeed, 
simply cope with – the natural processes of divergence which the market 
produces. The stronger the divergence, therefore, the greater the demands on the 
state. One of the important insights of Marx’s political economy is an 
understanding that nation state regulates class conflict, which is in turn a natural 
outcome of one of the market’s key social products, namely a separation of civil 
society into classes defined by the source of their income and its relation to 
property. 
Marx’s economic theory as such, however, does not dictate that the state 
should have a national form or indeed, even a territorially bounded form.13 To the 
contrary, Marx was in many senses the first globalisation theorist, a fact often 
forgotten by both the opponents and supporters of globalisation. It was Marx who 
first recognised that the market forms classes on a worldwide basis, independent 
of nation states, and that moreover the basic solidarity of property owners against 
wage-earners extends over national boundaries and transcends them. The 
capitalist class, for Marx, was an international class formed by the market. That is 
why he dedicated himself to constructing international institutions of the working 
class, to confront it also at international level. 
So why can’t a world state, or a system of statelike world institutions, play the 
same role as the nation-state? To succeed in this, the world institutions which 
arose under globalisation would have had to act, as do national states, to contain 
divergence and regulate conflict. But the evidence is that they have done exactly 
the opposite: they have accentuated divergence, and spawned conflict. 
Superimposed on the division of the world into classes is a division of the 
world’s territories, arising from a second great imperative of the capitalist market 
– the geographical concentration of capital, splitting these territories into 
competing blocs. The analysis of this phenomenon was a theoretical achievement 
of twentieth-century Marxists; the empirical evidence is that their basic analytical 
categories are still valid today.  
It is true that the most basic economic and social division in the world is that 
between classes. However, the most fundamental political division is between the 
‘Advanced’ countries as a whole and all the others, and this establishes the 
institutional framework within which class conflict is necessarily played out. This 
gives rise to a completely different type of state in the two parts of the world – 
11 
dominant states and dominated states. The typical function of the advanced 
country state is the extraction of a special advantage from the rest of the world, by 
monopolising sources of world surplus-profit – an exceptional profit over and 
above the world average which arises from the functioning of the world market. 
The typical function of the third world, or dominated state, is to protect its 
capitalists against this predation. It does so by facing both ways. On the one hand 
it must minimise the surplus profit that they lose through the operation of the 
world market. On the other hand it must suppress the implicit conflict between its 
own working people and the unholy alliance between the predatory capitalists 
outside the country, and the subordinated capitalists inside. 
‘Globalisation’ was a particular form of this whose political structure I have 
already analysed. In it, the predatory states delegated the economic aspect of their 
domination to the international financial institutions and suppressed the implicit 
competition between them. It is this delegation which has fallen foul of the 
destructive consequences of divergence. Increasingly, the dominated states have 
to organise their own, special, relationship with the rest of the world, just as they 
did  at the end of the last century in the age of classical imperialism. 
But the problem is that the system of dominating states is inadequate for this 
purpose because it consists of a single continental state – the USA – and a 
collection of national states, none of which is adequate on its own to confront the 
power of the USA, and each of which is being crushed by the fatal combination 
of political power and economic weight which the US state puts at the disposition 
of its capitalists. It is for precisely this reason that the politics of the twenty first 
century reduces to the political economy of regional state-building projects, 
regional alliances, and rival regional trading projects – the EEC, ALCA, 
Mercosur, APEC, and so on..14 
First, the Europeans have to try and construct a continental power adequate to 
confront the USA economically, politically and ultimately militarily. Second, the 
third world countries are driven, on pain of dissolution and extinction, to 
construct regional blocs and proto-states adequate to defend them both against the 
emergent superpowers. And third, the policies of both the USA and Europe are 
directed constantly towards the political division of the third world, as they were 
in the epch of classical imperialism.  
The most decisive political objective is to ensure that no continental third 
world state can emerge. This made destruction of the Soviet Union the prime 
objective of the pro-globalisation bloc. It is what requires it to demonise Islam, 
with its Pan-national aspirations; it makes the dissolution of India a constant sub-
text; and it makes China, already in effect a continental economy, the principal 
obstacle to the world order which the advanced countries require. ‘Terrorism’ is, 
in effect, a codeword for the ever-present threat of continental third-world 
alliances – for the danger of a pan-national third world coalition of sufficient 
weight, and with sufficient separation from the market in capital, to chart an 
independent path of development. 
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It is thus perfectly true that the present system of states is absolutely 
inadequate to regulate the economic consequences of globalisation. And it is 
equally perfectly untrue that a world system of governance can replace it. In 
consequence we have entered a period of generalised crisis of world governance. 
This process is leading not to the abolition of the state, but to a completely new 
structure of states and territories, driven by two phenomena: an increasingly 
political struggle of the dominant bloc against the rest of the world on the one 
hand, and the polarisation of the dominant bloc on the other. 
The real issue, therefore, is to study the structure of economic divergence 
region by region, to discard all utopian illusions, and ask where it is driving the 
corresponding structures of political domination. In order to do this, however, we 
need the soundest possible instruments of analysis. The next section of this 
chapter is therefore addressed to questions of methodology, and the last section 
will apply them concretely to analysing the new structure of the world’s 
economic geography. 
1.5 THE LIMITS OF STATISTICS 
How much reliance can be placed on numbers derived by adding up world GDP 
statistics, and how much can we trust the conclusions? I want to single out three 
questions, which I think are central to obtaining an accurate and complete picture 
of the economic geography of the Twenty-First Century. 
First, GDP statistics are available for whole countries only, and there is 
obviously differentiation within each country as well as between countries. Do 
national boundaries obscure the true geography of poverty? To put it more starkly, 
does poverty have no geography? 
Second, I have studied the data by converting it into world money. I have 
studied both inequality, and output, in strictly monetary terms, that is, in terms of 
ability to pay – to be precise, I have expressed them in US dollars at current 
market exchange rates. There are other measures of both income and output – for 
example, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars. They often give rise to different 
conclusions, which is why the international institutions, which were until the 
early 1990s quite suspicious of them, have now enthusiastically adopted them. So 
is inequality nothing more than a statistical construct? 
The third issue is the particular significance of China, does have a continental 
economy, which still maintains its independence from the market in capital, and 
which has seen unprecedented and sustained growth over the recent period of 
globalisation. China’s actual policies are very remote from the ideals which the 
IMF sold to the rest of the world from 1982 onwards, maintaining strict capital 
controls and rejecting the ‘shock therapy’ which devastated the Economies in 
Transition (among which, we should note, the IMF does not include China). Is 
China proof of the success of globalisation – or is it proof of the opposite? And 
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how should it be treated in the statistics to give an accurate picture of what is 
really going on? 
1.6 THE USE AND MISUSE OF AVERAGES 
Statistical agencies are geared up to collect data on a national basis. Access to 
data on world income distribution which cross country boundaries are virtually 
impossible to come by, and awareness of this fact is only now beginning to re-
allocate some fairly small resources to this question. 
However some simple arithmetic show that there are basic limits within which 
actual income in a country can range above or below national averages, and this 
becomes clear once we start to think about the most basic issue socially, namely, 
how many rich people, and how many poor people, can logically exist within a 
given territory, given its average income? 
Advanced third world countries? 
First, as regards the general scale of inequality – that is, the relation between the 
number of poor people in the world and the number of rich people in the world – 
it is statistically impossible that differences between averages, on the scale we see 
in the world today, can co-exist with declining, or even low, levels of inequality. 
The views expressed below in The Economist on June 26th 2003 represent, 
frankly, wishful thinking. 
Far from rising, global inequality has actually been falling substantially. Not when 
measured as the gap between the very richest and the very poorest. Nor when measured, as 
has until recently been the rather odd norm, as the difference between the average incomes 
of each country, regardless of population (thus counting Chad and China as if they were of 
equal size). But if it is measured in the way which is normal within countries, as the 
distribution of individual incomes, it has narrowed considerably. 
I agree that inequality, properly presented, does not reduce to comparing 
average income in one country with average income in another. But this is not the 
same as saying that geography counts for nothing. At the beginning of this 
chapter I did not compare one country with another. I compared the whole of one 
part of the world with the whole of the other part. 
All I did was to divide the world in two, using the IMF’s own classification. If 
world income is a cake, then before this phase of globalisation began, 82 per cent 
of the people in the world got 29 per cent of this cake to share among themselves. 
When it had finished, 84 per cent of them had to share 19 per cent of it among 
themselves. To present this as anything other than an increase in inequality is an 
act of statistical deception. 
To fix ideas, I will define ‘poor’ simply to mean living at or about an income 
equal to the average of the ‘rest of the world’ – that is, $3 per day in 1995 
dollars.15 It is then arithmetically impossible for the number of poor people to 
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decrease as long as average inequality is rising. This is such a basic statistical fact 
that faced with its persistent denial we can only conclude that the faculty of 
reason is being replaced by something else. 
Let us first suppose for the sake of argument that individual incomes within 
countries are in fact growing closer today – a questionable result in the light of 
figures cited by Robinson in this book. In that case, if average incomes in the two 
parts of the world are growing apart, the divergence between incomes of people 
living in them must also be diverging. Thus, consider the extreme case where 
everyone in each part of the world earns the same income. In that case, country 
averages would be a perfect guide to personal inequality. Every individual in each 
country would be earning exactly the same. Every one of the 4,288 million people 
in the ‘rest of the world’ would be earning 23 times less than every one of the 833 
million people in the ‘Advanced Countries’ – just over twice the differential that 
existed at the beginning of globalisation. 
Thus if, as the Economist suggests, incomes within each part of the world are 
becoming more equal, then this can only mean, since the average income in the 
two parts of the world have diverged, that individual incomes in these two parts 
of the world have also diverged. Nothing else is statistically possible.  
Let us look at an alternative possibility. Suppose instead that inequality within 
countries is large, or getting larger, compared with the differences in average 
income. But this too, given the averages reported above, would have to mean that 
the great majority of the world’s population is at least relatively poor, and 
growing poorer. Suppose, for example, that the entire average GDP of $1,160 in 
the ‘rest of the world’ in the year 2000 was appropriated by a rich class securing 
the same income as the average in the advanced countries – quite a modest idea, 
really. Their income would then be twenty-three times greater than the average in 
the third world. But this entire class has to fit inside the share of the cake which, 
in 2000, took up 19 per cent of the whole world’s income. This places an absolute 
limit on the size of this class: it cannot possibly make up more than one-twenty-
third of the population. For it to do so, the average for the whole of the ‘rest of the 
world’ would have to rise above $1,160 or, to put it in its most direct form, the 
share of the cake would have to get bigger.  
Moreover, even in that extreme case, the remaining population would have to 
earn nothing at all. Either, therefore, this rich class must be poorer than even the 
average for the advanced countries, or it must be very small. There is a simple 
trade-off from which the Economist’s anonymous writer must choose. Either this 
class is not really very rich, or it is not really very big. A class that is both rich and 
big simply cannot exist, statistically, in a section of the world which contains 
four-fifths of its people and appropriates a fifth of its income. 
It is technically possible – in a different world – to have a large number of 
people with high incomes, even though average incomes are very far apart. The 
arithmetical condition for this is that the number of people living in impoverished 
countries would have to be small compared with the world’s population. In that 
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case, we could see a small and desperately poor underclass, largely confined to 
marginal parts of the globe, against a background of generally increasing wealth. 
Since the existence of poor people is hard to deny, this is the way that their 
numbers are usually presented. This is, in essence, the analytical framework of 
the ‘Third Way’. This is articulated as if the political problems of globalisation 
were confined to relatively small and manageable layers of socially-excluded and 
marginalized individuals. Globalisation is treated as if the number of people 
living in a each slice of the cake was proportional to the size of the slice. The 
problem of liberal democracy is then to ensure that this small number of 
marginalized individuals are included in a general process of progress. 
However, the great majority of the world live in the small slice, and moreover 
the proportion is getting bigger. The 80/20 vision of the Third Way breaks down 
statistically once we reckon with the fact that this ‘marginalized’ layer consists of 
most people in the world. Actually, in terms of population, the world’s ‘marginal’ 
people are those living in the advanced countries. The sheer number of people 
living in poor countries dictates, statistically, that the overwhelming majority of 
the world’s people must also be poor, and any attempt to avoid this basic 
arithmetic fact is either wishful sophistry or wilful ignorance. In a world whose 
majority is poor, the marginals are the rich. This is why they have no option but to 
sustain their wealth by directly political domination. The political ‘integration’ of 
a majority by a minority is not a caring liberal democracy: it is a dictatorship with 
a conscience. 
Third world advanced countries? 
Only one other statistical possibility works in the opposite direction. This has 
been suggested by Paul Krugman. It corresponds politically to the outlook of 
Negri and Hardt,16 who seek to demonstrate, in essence, an unmediated identify of 
political interest between the poor of the first world and the mass of the third 
world. It could be that the high average incomes of the advanced countries are 
caused by the distillation of a super-rich class in the advanced countries, which 
raises the average although the majority in these countries lives in third-world 
conditions. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate this empirically.  
However, we must note, first, that it could provide no comfort to pro-
globalisers, since in this case political instability would be all the worse: the 
number of relatively poor people in the world would be understated by the 
averages rather than overstated. Second, however, it suggests that no significant 
section of the working classes of the advanced countries should have much 
interest in supporting their own imperialism’s activities. It is difficult to reconcile 
this with the level of support which, in the past, the working class organisations of 
the advanced countries have given to the wars of conquest of their own nations. 
And finally, it is only possible arithmetically if inequality within the advanced 
countries were substantially greater than within the rest of the world. This is 
empirically a hard thesis to sustain. 
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1.7 WHAT DOES MONEY BUY? PURCHASING POWER, 
PAYING POWER, AND GROWTH 
The figures used in this chapter were calculated, as has been said, by converting 
national GDPs into dollars at current exchange rates. Anyone with access to the 
Internet, incidentally, can verify them, since the IMF distributes them free of 
charge. 
This method, widely used by the IMF until the early 1990s, present a different 
picture from those generally now used when institutions attempt to assess the 
results of globalisation. In short, the globalisers have shifted the goalposts. Output 
is now usually presented for the purpose of comparing country outputs in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars.  
A PPP dollar is a fictitious currency unit which is supposed to represent the 
same quantity of goods in every place, at every time. No-one in the world actually 
consumes what a PPP dollar buys. It is constructed by calculating an ‘ideal’ 
basket of goods representing the average consumption of an imaginary world 
citizen.  
Such a citizen does not exist, because patterns of consumption are widely 
different in different parts of the world. Indeed, as we shall see, under 
globalisation consumption patterns have themselves diverged. Moreover PPP 
dollars do not exist, in a very fundamental sense: they cannot be used to pay bills 
or settle debts. A PPP dollar is not means of payment. It is not even a unit of 
account which can be used in international settlements like the European ‘Green 
Pound’. In particular, debtor countries cannot use them to pay their creditors, and 
if they could, the world’s debt would be reduced by three quarters.  
There is no single consistent PPP measure, and it is generally acknowledged 
that such a measure is theoretically impossible. In particular, a PPP measure 
which is good for making comparisons between country price levels, is bad at 
estimating aggregate output, and vice versa.17 Worse still a single measure of 
output which is valid both for comparisons in time and in space is not possible, 
and one can therefore either compare countries’ absolute levels using one PPP 
measure, or their growth rates using another – but not both, with the same 
measure. In short, it is theoretically impossible for a single PPP measure to serve 
as an indicator of both divergence and stagnation. For this reason the OECD took 
a decision as early as 1990 to disseminate two different sets of PPP measures:  
In 1989 UNSTAT, the OECD and Eurostat jointly convened an expert meeting to discuss 
the aggregation methods used in the calculation of PPPs and real expenditures. The experts 
recognised that the results of such calculations are used for many different purposes and 
that there is no one method of aggregation which can be considered satisfactory for all 
these purposes. They recommended the calculation and dissemination of two sets of 
results: one set to be aggregated using the EKS method, the other to be aggregated using 
the GK method [emphasis in original]18 
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This does not prevent most agencies, particularly in publications aimed at the 
general public, writing as if there were only one such measure or, worse, 
choosing the particular measure which proves the point they wish to make and 
then speaking authoritatively as if it were the only one available. This extends 
even to statistical authorities, as the OECD acerbically comments: 
Both Eurostat and the OECD have accepted the experts recommendations in principle, but 
there is a practical difficulty of particular importance to Eurostat. The results for 
Community countries are used for administrative purposes as well as for economic 
analysis. For this reason, Eurostat requires that only one set of results be recognised as the 
official results for the Community. 
That is, although it is theoretically ridiculous, politically the Europeans will do 
it anyway. So much for the enlightenment. 
Globalisation and the movement of world prices 
Let us for the sake of argument set aside for now all the above difficulties, and 
simply compare the results of measuring output in current dollars and in PPPs. 
Table 6 shows, for the bottom and top group of countries, the ratio of PPP output 
to dollar output in 1999 after adjusting world totals to be the same. 
It can be seen that the output of the advanced countries is estimated as 
systematically lower, and the output of the third world systematically higher, in 
PPPs than in dollars. The effect is huge: for example, when Sri Lanka at the 
bottom of the table is compared with Japan at the top, it will be treated as seven 
times less unequal in PPPs than in current exchange dollars. To put it another 
way, when Sri Lanka is paying its debts it will be allowed seven times less 
purchasing power per dollar than when it puts its case against structural 
adjustment. 
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Table 6: Ratio of PPP and real dollar GDP, highest and lowest in 1999 
Country Ratio of PPP GDP to real 
dollar GDP at market 
exchange rates 
Country Ratio of PPP GDP to real 
dollar GDP at market 
exchange rates 
Japan              0.62 Bangladesh             2.39 
Switzerland             0.63 Jordan                2.44 
Denmark               0.69 Colombia               2.48 
Norway                0.73 Philippines             2.50 
Sweden                0.75 Iran                 2.91 
Germany               0.78 Kenya                3.09 
Austria               0.79 Thailand               3.22 
Finland               0.80 Ghana                3.23 
Ireland               0.81 Bulgaria               3.26 
United Kingdom           0.83 Ethiopia               3.97 
Belgium               0.85 Nigeria               4.15 
France                0.86 India                4.23 
Netherlands             0.86 China                4.38 
United States            0.87 Pakistan               4.70 
Italy                0.93 Indonesia              4.81 
Israel                0.95 Syria                7.11 
Slovenia               1.01 Sri Lanka              7.13 
To some degree (though, because of theoretical imperfections in the PPP method, 
not entirely), a country whose PPP output is high compared with its dollar output 
will have lower prices. 
Hence if a country’s domestic products are cheap in comparison with their 
price in the USA, the international agencies will record it as producing more than 
it can actually raise by selling its produce in the world market; in some case a 
great deal more. For example as can be seen from table 6, in the IMF or World 
Bank’s estimates of the performance of China and India, they will multiply 
China’s actual money output by 4.38 and India’s by 4.24. 
But the IMF only does this when it wishes to prove that India is doing well as a 
result of globalisation, not when it enquires whether it can pay its bills. That is, 
the IMF uses ordinary dollars to assess whether a country has complied with its 
policies, and PPPs to assess whether they worked. 
Purchasing Power Parity and the contribution of India 
The cases which illustrate the problem most clearly are those of India and China, 
above all India which, unlike China, is yet to undergo a prolonged period of 
sustained growth, as Jayati Ghosh makes clear in her chapter in this book. There 
is no doubt that China has undergone a real and sustained growth, which I assess 
in the next section. But China does not rightfully belong in the category of 
‘globalised’ countries. The statistical effect of PPP measurements is to make it 
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appear as if China and India were engaged in an identical process, and to use this 
falsely-inflated growth as ‘proof’ of globalisation’s success.  
The GDP of India measured in 1996 PPPs was $1,783 billion but in 1990 current-
exchange-rate dollars it was $441.7 billion, because in India a dollar buys over 
four times as much as in the USA, as already shown in table 6. Thus whereas the 
combined national output of India and China in 1999 was worth $1,428 billion at 
current exchange rates, the IMF reports it as $5,932 billion dollars, nearly as 
much as the output of Europe which in PPP terms was $7,203 billion dollars. 
China and India have a specific statistical impact because since globalisation 
began, their Purchasing Power Parity has increased exceptionally rapidly. Chart 4 
shows the ratio of GDP, for China and India, measured in PPPs and constant US 
dollars at current market exchange rates. It can be seen that the GDP of these two 
countries, measured in PPPs, has effectively been multiplied by 250 per cent 
since the present phase of globalisation began. 
Chart 4: ratio of real dollar and PPP dollar measures of GDP, for China and 
India 
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This rise in the PPP dollar is clearly itself a specific effect of globalisation. The 
capacity of these nations to appropriate wealth in the world market has fallen 
precipitately, because local prices have fallen much faster than US prices. It is 
moreover unique to the developing countries, not least India and China.  
This has two profound implications. First, it means that globalisation has 
worsened the terms of trade. An Asian producer must work on average over four 
times longer to acquire US goods than a US producer, and seven times more than 
a Japanese producer to acquire Japanese goods. Developing countries, 
particularly Asian countries, are far less equipped to acquire on the market the 
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produce of the advanced countries – which are precisely what they need in order 
to invest competitively, and moreover are precisely the goods which the IMF 
structural adjustment plans oblige them to buy. A central feature of these plans is 
the developing countries are supposed to concentrate on exporting labour-
intensive, primary produce. The substantial extra supply of these goods created 
has played a major role in producing a catastrophic fall in commodity prices, 
vitiating the whole strategy. 
Although the divergence of PPP and current-exchange measures is universal 
throughout the non-advanced countries, its statistical effect on aggregates is 
heavily concentrated on China and India because of their size. If these two large 
Asian countries are removed from the calculation, the divergence which is 
evident in real dollar terms reappears even in PPP terms. As Table 7 shows 
divergence, measured in PPP terms, appears over the period of globalisation to 
have fallen from 7.4 to 6.9. But if Asia is removed from the calculation, this ratio 
has risen from 3.5 to 5.1 during the period of globalisation, having remained 
virtually constant in the preceding four decades. 
Table 7: Growth of GDP per capita with and without Asia, in PPP dollars 
GDP per capita in 1990 Purchasing Power 
Parity dollars 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 
Rest of the World $845$1,147 $1,464 $1,936 $2,341 $3,124 
Rest of world without Asia $1,712$2,244 $3,060 $4,059 $3,875 $4,239 
Advanced or advancing countries $5,480$7,569$11,190$14,402$18,190 $21,539 
Divergence ratio with Asia included  6.5  6.6  7.6  7.4  7.8  6.9 
Divergence ratio with Asia excluded  3.2  3.4  3.7  3.5  4.7  5.1 
 
The law of two prices 
Actually, the very fact that GDP measured in real dollars is diverging from GDP 
measured in PPPs signifies that something new is going on. Thirty years ago 
world output was rising unambiguously, and now it is not. The most definite  
post-modern statement that can be made, by anyone who wishes to argue that 
globalisation works, is that this view is supported only if one measures output in 
one particular way. 
The divergence of PPP measures of income from a simple monetary measure 
shows something else: it shows that globalisation has produced a divergence not 
just in incomes but in prices. Paradoxically globalisation, which was supposed to 
act to bring about a harmonised world market, is creating a dual system of world 
prices. In particular we can summarise its overall effect quite simply: it has driven 
apart the cost of wages and capital. We have, in effect, a global cost of capital and 
a local cost of labour.  
It is precisely because of this bipolar price system that a single PPP measure 
cannot convey what is really going on. Moreover it is in any case nonsensical to 
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argue that the key process in the world is the formation of an integrated world 
market, and then study it by concentrating on local differences. 
What we must really study is the combined effect of price differentiation and 
output differentiation, and understand that they are not two separate phenomena 
but completely interdependent. To be absolutely precise, price differentiation is a 
consequence of income differentiation and is part of the proof that it is happening. 
If incomes really were converging, then why on earth should prices be diverging? 
It makes no sense at all. The actual outcome, statistically, of measuring output in 
PPPs is that the reality – income divergence in money terms – produces an effect 
– price differentiation – which is then used to hide the original cause, namely, the 
income differentiation. 
It is really not hard to see why the two measures of output are diverging: it is 
because low incomes are possible only on the basis of low wages. Low wages 
exist both because people consume less, and because the products that make up 
the wage-basket (so-called ‘non-traded goods’) are themselves cheaper. What the 
PPP measure actually does, reduced to its essence, is to treat all wage-baskets as 
if they were equal, even though they cost different amounts.  
This might be valid were it not for the fact that there is a world market and a 
world prices for the produce of the advanced countries – that is, high-tech 
investment goods. The divergence of world prices is, primarily, a divergence of 
country wages from global capital goods. The growing gap between PPP and 
monetary measures of output is merely a reflection of this price divergence: a 
country whose wages are low, is artificially accounted as having a high output, by 
multiplying these wages by the price differential for wage products in the two 
parts of the world. 
There are numerous reasons to suppose that this obscures the real process. 
Most importantly, it mixes up the direction of causality. In a commodified world. 
people do not make money because they live well; they live well because they 
make money. The first thing we must understand, if we want to know whether a 
country can or cannot extract itself from poverty, is how much money it has at its 
disposal with which to do it.  
This is particularly important since a country’s income is not just used to live 
on, but to invest and grow. It is a fund from which all expenditures must be met, 
and the crucial factor is the cost, not of wage-goods, but of investment goods – 
which are, generally, world goods produced in the advanced countries and which 
cost advanced-country prices.  
How can a poor country escape poverty? It must grow faster than an advanced 
country. To do this it must invest. It then has two choices: it may produce 
investment goods itself, or it may buy them on world markets. But investment 
goods are precisely that part of the ‘world basket’ which are expensive to produce 
locally, because they involve technology, and technology is what costs money. If, 
therefore, a country produces investment goods locally, it will not be able to use 
the advantages of cheap local wage-goods or even cheap local labour to anything 
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like the extent it can with consumer goods, because technologically sophisticated 
processes command high incomes.19 If on the other hand it purchases investment 
goods on world markets – the fate allotted it in any case by the IMF policies – 
then it will pay, not local but global prices. It will pay, in fact, the same amount of 
money as must be paid by its competitors in the advanced countries.  
The difference between PPP and current-exchange measures of income boils 
down to this: the world is divided and there is no single, theoretically consistent 
measure of output volume which is valid for both parts of the world. We must 
choose whether to measure economic performance on the basis of the price 
structure of the advanced and dominant part of the world or that of the the 
dominated, dependent part of the world.. 
We wish to compare the growth prospects of the two parts of the world – 
advanced and non-advanced. The advanced countries are characterised above all 
by their near-total monopoly of technology – that is, of the means to make 
investment goods. The remainder can close the gap only by acquiring this 
technology, embedded in investment goods which it is the special privilege of the 
advanced countries to sell into the world market. If we want to find out whether a 
poor country can cease being poor, we must find out whether it can buy the 
advanced capital goods which it needs in order to raise its rate of productivity 
growth above that of the global North. These goods are generally made in the 
advanced countries, or moreover form a proportionately larger part of their annual 
expenditure. It is therefore the price structure of the advanced countries 
themselves which must be used as the basis of comparison, and that is why we 
have chosen to study world output and inequality in terms of the most dominant 
and largest advanced country – the USA.20 
In the latter case the determining factor which decides whether much a country 
may catch up with or even hold its own against the technologically advanced 
nations, is its ability to purchase this technology on the world market; that is, the 
rate at which its own produce exchanges for the products of the advanced 
countries. GDP in real dollars measures this capacity: the ability to acquire the 
means to compete globally, in global markets. The figures above show that, above 
all, globalisation is destroying the poorer nations’ capacity to grow. It is steadily 
reducing, or at best holding constant, their capacity to purchase what they need to 
stop being poor. It is inevitable, unless countervailing forces are brought into play, 
that this will work its way through into declining relative incomes and, as long as 
general stagnation persists, declining absolute incomes and declining standards of 
living. 
1.8 THE STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA  
Bodies which have an interest in beating the drum for globalisation tend to 
conceal China’s specific role by including it in aggregate figures, but omitting it 
as an individual entity. The IMF, for example, simply includes it statistically in 
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the region of ‘Asia’ – yet it places the central Asian republics in ‘Transcaucasus 
and Central Asia’. Notably also, it does not classify China as ‘transitional’. 
In some cases the presentation of China’s data is downright tendentious. Our 
anonymous Economist writer says 
countries in Asia have actually been narrowing the gap substantially: there, excluding 
already-developed Japan, in 1950-2001 income per head increased fivefold. In the early 
decades, Asian growth could be dismissed as exceptional, given that it was limited mainly 
to the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore, and two politically anomalous countries, 
Taiwan and South Korea. But since 1980, not only has growth spread to South-East Asia 
but it has also accelerated in the world's most populous countries, China and India. Given 
that Asia as a whole is home to well over half of the world's people, such progress can no 
longer be dismissed. 
It is true that Asia should not be dismissed. But if we leave out China, then 
even in PPPs, the measure applied by the Economist’s author, income per head in 
Asia rose by 205 per cent, a considerably slower rate than ‘fivefold’ and, in fact, 
equivalent to a rather pedestrian annual growth rate of 2.25 per cent, somewhat 
less than the world average over the same period. 
The effect of China on the ‘rest of the world’ category is equally salutary. Table 
5a shows the annual growth rates of GDP per capita of the advanced regions, and 
of the rest of the world with and without China.21  
Table 5a: Growth of GDP per capita with and without China 
Ten-year total growth of GDP per 
capita in constant 1995 dollars 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 
Rest of World 35.4% -19.8% -14.5% 
Rest of World without China 32.6% -20.2% -25.1% 
Without China, the ‘rest of the world’ was declining almost twice as fast. The 
statistical impact of this fast growth of China is most marked in the 1990s. This 
highlights the problem with another tendency in the literature, which is to link 
China and India together as if they were part of a common ‘Asian miracle’. But 
as table 5b shows, from 1990 onwards China’s growth began to outstrip that of 
India, in real dollar terms, beyond all recognition. Moreover the change in the 
performance of the economy of China is of an entirely different order of 
magnitude. When an economy doubles in size in a decade, and above all when it 
contains between a quarter and a fifth of the world’s people, it does not merely 
make it a ‘bigger’ economy but transforms world politics.  
Table 5b: Growth of GDP per capita of China and India 
Ten-year total growth of GDP per 
capita in constant 1995 dollars 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 
China 55.0% -26.7% 103.4% 
India 13.0% -4.1% 1.1% 
By 2010 China would, if current growth trends were sustained, produce an output 
worth more in dollars than Japan’s, and by 2023 it would produce more than 
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Europe. In PPP terms it is widely reported that its GDP will equal America’s by 
2015 and it is already has the second largest output in the world. An implication 
not lost on strategic planners is that China has the capability in our lifetimes to 
become a military rival of the USA, which completely change the world relation 
of forces. It would for example make nonsense of the idea that the next century 
will be an American one. 
Chart 2: GDP per head of China and India, relative to GDP per head of 
the other developing countries 
China and India relative to GDP per head of developing countries
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This process has already transformed China’s relation to the developing world, 
and thereby the developing world itself, as Chart 2 shows. This chart plots the 
GDP per head of China and India, relative to the average of all the other 
developing countries excluding China and India. In 1990, both China and India 
were well below the average. But by 2000, China’s GDP per head placed it with 
striking distance of the average. 
The effect of this on the growth of inequality between the developing and 
advanced countries is so striking that it clearly shows up even in PPP dollars. If 
China is included in the numerator and denominator, inequality measured in this 
way (in PPP dollars) has hardly risen at all since 1950. But if China is excluded, 
there is a clear rising trend which moreover accelerated sharply in 1975 and after 
a brief fall, resumed its upward trend in 1995. 
Chart 3 shows the inequality ratio between the advanced countries and the rest 
of the world, with and without China, measured in PPPs 
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Chart 3: Inequality with and without China, measured in PPPs 
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Is China really growing? 
Faced with the above facts, a considerable discussion has been going on about 
what the GDP of China actually is. In and of itself, this reflects the very fact that 
China’s economy is far from simply capitalist; they centre on such facts that, for 
example, there is no reliable expenditure measure of production in China because 
so much of it is not for money. On an extreme view, China’s statistics therefore 
distort its output so much that most of its recorded growth is a fake. 
Very well, consider the extreme opposite view, that in reality, China’s income 
growth rate is little more than 2 per cent per year. But the IMF accepts China’s 
statistics more or less at face value, and the conclusions which the IMF draws 
about world output depend on this assumption. If the value recorded by Chinese 
statisticians for China’s output is false, then most of the figures recorded by the 
IMF for the world are themselves false, and with them most of the claims of the 
globalisers in which, implicitly or explicitly, China’s success is included in the 
success of globalisation.  
For this reason, in the last part of this chapter, we will study the dependent 
world as it should be studied, independent of China. 
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1.9 THE NEW REGIONALISM AND THE POLITICAL 
GEOGRAPHY OF DIVERGENCE 
Divergence is not uniform. The advanced countries have moved away from the 
developing countries, the advanced countries have divided among themselves 
and, not least, the countries in transition have undergone a particularly sharp 
divergence which dates very precisely from the moment of the dissolution of the 
USSR. However within regions the process is more variable. Is divergence is 
nothing more than a geographical process, in which some regions have done well 
and others have not? This is certainly one aspect of divergence. Thus, for 
example, South-East Asia has grown substantially faster than Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Nonetheless, the evidence is clear that the separation of the developing from 
the advanced countries impacts on every region and overrides regional 
differentiation. There is thus no evidence that any regional group of developing 
countries is ‘pulling away from the pack’, with the specific exception of the group 
of ‘Newly Industrialised Asian Countries’ (NIACs) – whose population, it should 
not be forgotten, is in total smaller than most major European countries. 
So what processes of divergence and differentiation are actually at work? In 
order to go any deeper, some means of investigation is needed. When the IMF or 
World Bank divides the world into the ‘advanced countries’ and the rest, they 
employ a clear prior concept of what the advanced countries are, using a 
classification that does not itself presuppose wealth or poverty. The starting point 
is a form of economic organisation; a manner in which these countries arrange to 
extract surplus from the world’s resources. The question of whether they are rich 
or poor is an outcome, an object of enquiry, not an initial part of the definition. 
If we have no prior classification in mind, we are obliged to begin from what 
the data itself provides. We have to study the distribution of wealthy and poor as 
such and ask whether the evidence suggests that the wealthy are becoming more 
wealthy, relative to the poor. There are then two difficulties.  
The first problem, dealt with earlier, is that data is almost all available on the 
basis of countries, rather than peoples. We do not know the income distribution 
within each country and so it is difficult to study income distribution completely 
independent of geography. Indeed it may not be right to do so, if it turns out that 
nations and national states, despite globalisation, remain a fundamental 
determinant the path of economic development which a country and its people 
can follow. Nevertheless, since this is one of the things we are trying to ascertain, 
we cannot begin by supposing it. 
Studies have slowly begun to emerge which attempt to correct for this. The 
problem is that their starting point is the study of poverty as such and so the 
measure they concern themselves with is personal income. But as we have 
already pointed out, personal income is only one part of the total money wealth 
which a given country acquires on the world market. It is a caused factor rather 
than a causal factor, and does not allow us to get to the bottom of the real process 
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of divergence. In point of fact the real figure we are after is the productivity of 
labour; it is the wealth which is generated by the activity of the country.  
As most economists recognise, GDP per capita is actually a proxy for this 
magnitude. What should be measured, if the figures were available, is the 
distribution of wealth-creating capacity or, to be precise, value-creating capacity. 
This would yield a very different distribution than personal income since badly-
paid people in a poor country are often very productive of wealth, as is clear from 
the large profits of multinationals that employ this labour. 
The second problem is how to measure divergence in any case. What should 
be compared with what? When we had made a prior separation of the world into 
developed and advancing countries we could simply compare the income of one 
group with the income of another group. But now there are no ‘natural’ groupings 
to compare. Here we combine three procedures.  
First, we can try to ascertain the geographical distribution of income. 
Relatively well-defined regions of the world exist such as Latin America, Africa, 
and so on. Are they diverging from each other, and are incomes diverging within 
them? 
Second, since we already know that the advanced countries and the developing 
countries follow a very different path, we will confuse what we wish to study if 
we mix them up. We should therefore study geographical relations in, and 
between, the non-advanced countries.  
Third, in order to see what is going on independent of geography, the simplest 
procedure is to divide the population into groups of equal size, and rank them. 
The commonest summary measure is quintiles: groups of twenty per cent of the 
population, and this is what we will study. 
In the absence of figures on this quantity we have to adopt the most neutral 
assumption, which is that on average, everyone in a country generates the same 
wealth. All quintiles in this section have been calculated on this basis.22 The 
figures are very striking. 
 
Table 8: Quintiles of GDP per capita of the non-advanced countries (without 
China) as a proportion of average GDP per capita  
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Bottom 20 %  0.27  0.01  0.23  0.30  0.25  0.19  0.20  0.21  0.22 
Second 20 %  0.38  0.01  0.26  0.37  0.36  0.30  0.34  0.36  0.39 
Third 20 %  0.42  0.01  0.46  0.45  0.40  0.34  0.36  0.39  0.42 
Fourth 20 %  0.84  0.03  0.87  0.94  0.98  0.93  0.83  0.86  0.93 
Top 20 %  3.10  0.08  3.17  2.94  3.02  3.25  3.28  3.19  3.05 
Table 9: Quintiles of GDP per capita of the non-advanced countries, without 
China, in real dollars at current exchange rates 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Bottom 20 % $277 $396 $384 $323 $284 $239 $239 $234 $234 
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Second 20 % $390 $451 $441 $392 $421 $376 $408 $402 $413 
Third 20 % $437 $597 $771 $476 $460 $423 $431 $431 $436 
Fourth 20 % $868 $1,104 $1,451 $999 $1,135 $1,167 $986 $956 $976 
Top 20 % $3,213 $3,471 $5,280 $3,127 $3,495 $4,074 $3,913 $3,567 $3,200 
Average $1,036 41,203 $1,665 $1,063 $1,157 $1,254 $1,194 $1,117 $1,050 
Table 8 shows the ratio of each quintile to the average. Table 9 shows the per 
capita income of each quintile in real 1995 dollars, to fix ideas. It must be 
stressed, as throughout this chapter, that measures of divergence, which is a ratio 
of incomes, does not depend on any particular method of price deflation or indeed 
on using any particular currency. It depends only on measuring incomes in terms 
of their purchasing power on the world market, at current exchange rates. 
If there was substantive divergence going on within the developing countries – 
either because an especially rich or an especially poor layer were distilling out – 
we should expect to see the lower ratios falling and the upper ratios rising. In fact 
over thirty years there has been almost no change at all, either in the relative 
position of any the developing country quintiles, or in their absolute level. In the 
ten years before the current phase of globalisation the top three quintiles, most 
notably the first, rose by around 60 percent – and then fell back. The fourth 
quintile has grown by little under 80 per cent.  
Apart from that the picture is almost completely static. The ratio between the 
top quintile and the bottom – the most usual measure of divergence – was 11.6 in 
1970, and 13.7 in 2002. The ratio between the fourth and bottom quintile rose 
from 3.1 to 4.2. These ratios should be contrasted with the relation between the 
average GDP of the advanced countries and the average GDP of the developed 
countries, already mentioned above, which rose from 8.4 to 23.3. The net effect 
of globalisation is to drive a gigantic wedge between the advanced countries as a 
whole and the developing countries as a whole, whilst at the same time producing 
almost zero net growth and almost no divergence between the developing 
countries. 
Indeed, the stability of developing country GDP per capita is so remarkable 
that it is an accurate first approximation to say that developing country GDP is 
effectively constant, which implies that the advanced countries have become 
organised, through globalisation, to extract from the developing countries all the 
gains of productivity; that is, all excess profit above the bare minimum required 
simply to maintain the peoples of these countries, on average, at a fixed rate of 
value-appropriating capacity.  
Table 10: Regional per capita incomes relative to the average per capita 
income of the rest of the world, without China  
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
AsiaWithoutChina 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Africa 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Transition 4.2 3.8 3.0 5.0 4.7 1.5 1.4 1.7 2.0 
LA 2.2 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.8 
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Mideast 1.7 2.9 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.6 
Advanced SE Asia 5.2 7.4 7.4 10.8 18.2 24.4 21.2 19.6 20.1 
Euro 7.4 10.3 10.3 10.2 18.6 19.2 16.7 17.5 20.0 
USA 16.4 15.6 12.8 22.1 22.7 22.0 26.5 28.1 30.2 
This enables us to create what is, in effect, an absolute standard of divergence; we 
may measure the GDP per capita of any country, group of countries, or group of 
people, as a proportion of average developing country GDP. This standard is a 
useful one to chart, therefore, two things: first of all the divergence between the 
principal geographical regions of the world and, second, within these 
geographical regions. 
Chart 6: GDP per capita of the world’s regions, as a proportion of GDP per 
capita of the developing countries without China 
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On the basis of this standard, we can take an overview of the principal regions 
of the world and including the advanced countries as a comparison. This is shown 
in table 10, and displayed also in chart 6. 
The pattern is a very clear one and completely confirms the division of the 
world into two quite distinct blocs. The developing regions have, if anything, 
converged. The countries in transition were plunged into the ranks of the 
developing countries, which in turn have converged into two groups: Latin 
America, the Middle East and the countries in transition, with average incomes 
about three times that of the developing countries as a whole; and Asia and 
Africa, whose incomes have also converged and are about half that of the 
developing countries as a whole. The wealthiest and least wealthy group of 
developing countries (the Middle East and Asia) are separated by a factor of just 
over six.  
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In contrast the advanced countries pulled away sharply, in the course of the 
only real departure from an extremely static geopolitical division, namely, the 
very rapid growth of the small group of Newly-Industrialised Asian Countries 
(NIACS), included here in the category of advanced South-East Asia, along with 
Japan, New Zealand and Australia. Thus, in sum, only four countries have broken 
away from the group of developing countries, with a total population amounting 
to 82,000,000 in 2002. 
Among the advanced countries, however, a new development set in during the 
late 1990s, namely the rapid relative growth of Advanced South-East Asia came 
to an abrupt halt and began to reverse, as did that of Europe. The USA pulled 
away from everyone. This polarisation of the advanced countries themselves 
highlights the onset of a intensified phase of rivalry between the principal 
geographical groups. 
Do the regional aggregates conceal a differentiation within regions? Only here 
is the picture more mixed. To study it, we present the more usual measure, 
discussed above, of the ratio of each quintile’s average income to the average of 
the first quintile. 
Tables 11-15: ratio of quintile GDP to GDP of bottom quintile 
Table 10: Latin America 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Q2 1.26 1.44 1.28 1.79 2.38 1.77 2.01 1.73 1.65 
Q3 1.42 1.54 1.32 1.93 3.15 2.23 2.29 1.87 1.72 
Q4 2.60 2.77 2.94 2.49 3.17 2.61 3.43 3.35 2.36 
Q5 5.24 3.84 3.95 3.39 3.72 3.45 4.33 4.20 4.22 
Table 11: Middle East 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Q2 1.24 1.87 2.28 1.28 1.19 1.25 1.06 1.14 1.15 
Q3 1.61 2.66 2.95 1.53 1.30 1.58 1.19 1.31 1.43 
Q4 2.24 3.48 4.37 1.81 2.10 2.93 2.27 1.64 2.25 
Q5 5.20 8.71 17.82 6.37 5.02 7.78 6.79 6.48 6.94 
Table 12: Countries in Transition 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Q2 1.70 1.48 1.57 1.51 1.75 2.27 2.02 2.16 2.39 
Q3 2.19 2.29 2.47 2.81 3.78 4.87 3.37 3.75 4.23 
Q4 2.31 2.58 2.81 3.20 4.29 5.27 3.42 3.89 4.37 
Q5 2.36 2.61 2.84 3.23 4.33 8.46 8.01 8.40 9.38 
Table 13: Asia without China 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Q2 1.46 1.06 1.16 1.18 1.42 1.15 1.23 1.27 1.25 
Q3 1.47 1.06 1.16 1.18 1.42 1.15 1.23 1.29 1.26 
Q4 1.54 1.23 1.73 1.37 1.53 1.52 1.31 1.34 1.35 
31 
Q5 2.74 2.16 3.13 2.39 3.16 4.16 2.65 2.50 2.67 
Table 14: Africa 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Q2 1.85 2.24 1.94 1.47 1.50 1.79 2.24 2.16 2.30 
Q3 2.15 3.35 3.12 2.02 1.82 2.24 3.15 3.07 3.12 
Q4 3.53 4.13 4.67 2.76 3.94 3.80 4.08 3.99 4.22 
Q5 9.48 9.89 10.23 8.85 10.61 18.24 18.61 17.04 17.63 
In only two cases is there significant divergence within the region: Africa, where 
the top 20 per cent has reached a GDP equal to 17.6 times that of the poorest; and 
the countries in transition – in fact, the former Soviet Union and former Eastern 
Europe.  
Nation-building and nation-destruction 
In the case of the countries in transition a point has to be made: a decisive impact 
of the globalisation process was a dramatic growth in divergence precisely in that 
situation where it was accompanied politically by the dissolution of a territorial 
state. Moreover the most rapid phase of divergence came after, not before, the 
territorial state was dissolved. The territorial state, whatever its other economic 
weaknesses, clearly constituted a substantial barrier to divergence.  
Contrary to the assertion of the globalisation thesis, the real process was not 
that first the economic processes took shape, and then the state dissolved or lost 
its power but precisely the opposite: first the state was dissolved, then the 
economic processes took over. 
It is in this light that we turn to the last and most interesting regional process, 
namely the situation in the Euro zone, shown in table 14. It is here, and only here, 
that we note a strong process of convergence: by 2002 a factor of no more than 
1.77 separated the richest 20 per cent from the poorest 20 per cent. This is where 
a territorial state is in the process of formation. 
This also directly contradictions the principal thesis of globalisation, which is 
that the state is powerless in the face of economic forces. In the case of Europe, 
the national states were of insufficient size to counter the enormous economic and 
political weight of the USA. Actually, what we see in Europe is not the 
dissolution of the power of the territorial state but a drive to constitute a new, 
continental, territorial state. This process is driven by an economic imperative, 
namely, to constitute itself as a more effective appropriator of the value created in 
the third world than the USA itself. 
Table 14: Euro zone ratio of quintile GDP to GDP of bottom quintile  
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Q2 1.57 1.31 1.49 1.65 1.48 1.31 1.43 1.40 1.37 
Q3 1.76 1.64 1.75 1.74 1.59 1.65 1.58 1.52 1.47 
Q4 1.89 1.95 1.96 1.86 1.63 1.93 1.63 1.58 1.54 
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Q5 2.26 2.33 2.28 2.28 1.91 2.17 1.87 1.80 1.77 
 
In summary , the post-globalisation world is neither the outcome of a teleological 
and unstoppable process of nation dissolution, nor is it the result of a conscious 
and organised plot hatched in the USA. It is an outcome of a contradiction driven 
by the market’s inexorable tendency to geographical polarisation. The capitalist 
world order has shown itself unable to escape the requirement of a system of 
territorial states. But on the other hand , the existing system of territorial states is 
clearly absolutely inadequate for its requirements. The capitalists of the USA and 
of Europe are intervening in this process with a strategic vision, which is to 
reconstitute themselves as dominant continental powers capable of intervening on 
a world scale with political and military might to secure what the economic 
legacy of globalisation has failed to deliver. 
At the same time within the non-advanced countries, economic convergence 
with each other, in contradiction to their divergence from the advanced countries, 
poses them a possibility, and a sharp choice. What is possible is mutual self-
defence. The relation of forces, to be sure, is not adequate for reconstituting such 
bodies as the non-aligned movement. But the G21, and Mercosur, have both 
shown, that they have an unused capability. What prevents them using this 
capability is the capacity of the dominant powers to buy off and divide the elites 
of these countries, who have so far risen with the tide of globalisation and have 
no interest in confronting the dominant powers. It falls, therefore, to heir popular 
classes themselves to intervene politically on the world stage, recognising the 
fundamental identities of interest which are created by the polarisation of the 
world. 
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